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ABSTRACT. At the end of the 19th century, Georges Vacher de Lapouge
and Otto Ammon founded a school of thought denominated “social
anthropology” or “anthropo-sociology,” aimed at placing racism on a
scientific basis. Their intent was to create a new discipline into which
the themes of biological heredity, natural selection, social stratifica-
tion, and political organization were to converge. This paper intends
to demonstrate the wide resonance that anthroposociology had in the
economic literature, analyzing the thought of authors such as Carlos C.
Closson, Vilfredo Pareto, and Thorstein Veblen. A particular focus will
be on the racial and eugenic arguments used as explanation of social
and economic inequality.
Social anthropology is today considered a flourishing branch of
human knowledge, promoted all over the world by specialist journals
and scientific institutions.1 However, the social anthropology dealt
with in these pages has little to do with this reality. The object of this
research is the thought of authors such as the Frenchman Georges
Vacher de Lapouge and the German Otto Ammon, who, in the second
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half of the 19th century promoted a new discipline, with an explicitly
racist and eugenic content that they initially called “social anthropol-
ogy” and later named “anthro[po]-sociology.” In the last decades of the
19th century, this discipline had vast resonance in European and
American culture. Its fortunes were obscured with the beginning of
the new century, but, however, were strongly rooted in Germany,
where it became an incubator for the National Socialist eugenic
projects (Mosse 1978). This work intends to demonstrate the wide
resonance that this interpretation of social anthropology also had in
the economic literature of the period.
One of the inducements to undertaking this research is the increas-
ing interest shown by historians of economic thought in the relation-
ship between eugenics, racism, and political economy. Numerous
contributions on the question recently have been published,2 none-
theless, neglecting the thought of the so-called school of social
anthropologists. Much more studied instead is the reception given to
the theories of Lapouge and Ammon in the sociological field,3 where
the parabola of the doctrine has been highlighted; after sudden
popularity, sanctioned by the space dedicated to it in the major
sociological reviews, social anthropology was progressively ousted
from the scientific sociological panorama following its scientific del-
egitimization. In this paper we propose an analogous reconstruction
from the economic standpoint. In analyzing the spread of anthroposo-
ciological theories in the economic field, major emphasis will be laid
on the eugenic and racial explanations for social stratification, which
constitute the heart of such a doctrine.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section is dedicated to
a brief presentation of the social theories of Georges Vacher de
Lapouge and Otto Ammon, the founders of the school of social
anthropology. The second section comprises an overview of the
articles that the most authoritative economic reviews of the period,
principally the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Journal of
Political Economy, dedicated to the school, chiefly through the agency
of Carlos C. Closson, an indefatigable popularizer of the theories of
Lapouge and Ammon in the English-speaking world. The third section
of the paper enters into the principal question; that is, the explana-
tion offered by the social anthropologists for economic and social
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inequality. The fourth section then discusses the influence of social
anthropology on Vilfredo Pareto, one of the most authoritative schol-
ars of social hierarchies, and shows how responsive he was to the
topics discussed by Lapouge and Ammon. In the fifth part, the paper
will illustrate the growth of criticisms of social anthropology and how
it was ostracized with the coming of the new century, both by
economists and by sociologists. In the last part will be discussed the
role of Thorstein Veblen in the spreading of social anthropology in
economic literature, before of its epilogue.
I
The School of Social Anthropology:
Georges Vacher de Lapouge and Otto Ammon
AMMON AND Lapouge are authors who are seldom quoted in the history
of social science.4 At the turn of the century, however, their fame was
notable and their writings were diffused by the journals of various
scientific disciplines. The two scholars were, in truth, difficult to
classify from a strictly disciplinary point of view, given that they
operated in a grey area covering craniometry, anthropology, sociol-
ogy, and economics. Their scientific aims were in fact intended to
create of a new branch of knowledge, for which they coined the term
“social anthropology” or “anthropo-sociology.”5
Each declared himself to be the founder of the new discipline,
stating a precise period for its inception. As Lapouge wrote (1897: 57),
“the establishment of anthro-sociology as a distinct branch of inves-
tigation dates from my lectures at the University of Montpellier (1886–
1892) and from the publication by Ammon of his research on the
conscripts of Baden.” Born in 1854, Lapouge became librarian at the
University of Montpellier in 1886, after he failed to receive a university
chair. His major works—Les sélections sociales (1896), L’aryen, son ròle
social (1899), and Race et milieu social (1909)—are based on his
lectures at Montpellier, where “he taught a variety of courses, con-
ducted population survey, compiling craniometric data and publishing
a flurry of articles.” During the late 1880s he wrote in the Revue
d’anthropologie, but in 1895 the Revue “ceased to accepting his
contributions.” In 1893 he left Montpellier and became a librarian in
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Rennes. After 1900, his writings were published mainly in Germany,
for the most part in the Politisch-anthropologische Revue, the racist
journal founded and financed by Ludwig Woltmann. In his last years,
he became the maître à penser of the official race theorists of National
Socialism. “He died in 1936, virtually ignored by French intellectual
circles.”6
There is scarce biographical information on Otto Ammon (1842–
1916). An engineer and journalist, he became one of the most influ-
ential racial anthropologists of his day, greatly influencing the move
toward National Socialism in Germany (Gasman 1971: 148). Like
Lapouge, he never held an academic post (Drouard 2005: 15). “His
first contribution came as an unexpected result of an investigation of
the army recruits of Baden,” which he carried out in 1890 as secretary
to the anthropological commission of the archaeological society in
Karlsruhe. Among many other things, “he found that there was a
difference between rural and urban populations as regards hair-color,
eye-color and head-form” (Hankins 1931: 110). The outcome of this
research was his monographs (1890 and 1893) “that established his
anthropometric credentials” (Llobera 2003: 105). His major work
was Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre naturlichen Grundlagen (The
Social Order and Its Natural Bases), published in 1895 and translated
into French in 1900. Albeit Lapouge designated Ammon as co-founder
of his school of anthroposociology, the German writer always
regarded Lapouge “as a student regards his master.”7 Together with
Lapouge, Ammon was one of the most fervent supporters of Social
Darwinism, spreading the idea that society, like nature itself, is subject
to universal laws of natural selection and that the social sciences could
not disregard Darwin’s recent discoveries in the biological field.8
Social Darwinism appears in fact to be the cultural context in which
to set Ammon and Lapouge’s anthroposociology, and it is therefore
hardly surprising that almost all of those who interpret their work
characterize them as “Social Darwinists.”9 This appellation, while
undoubtedly true, nonetheless contains some snares. “Social Darwin-
ism” is indeed one of the most abused terms in the history of social
sciences and also one of the most ambiguous. As Hawkins (1997: 32)
has pointed out, “ ‘Darwinism’ was not a fixed entity” and “there are
a series of indeterminacies surrounding some of its elements.” The
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question whether Darwin himself was a Social Darwinist is not a trivial
one. Problems arise, for instance, in looking at the historical relation
between Social Darwinism and eugenics, as “it was possible to
support one and not the other” (Hawkins 1997: 6). This was not the
case for the anthroposociological theories, which postulated a very
close association between Social Darwinism and eugenics. Further-
more, not all Social Darwinists followed the racist path, while
Lapouge’s and Ammon’s Social Darwinism was indeed a theory with
an explicit racist content. This ambiguity makes it difficult to evaluate
the real intellectual debt of Ammon and Lapouge to Darwin.
In order to understand the cultural matrices of social anthropology,
it is necessary to begin with the radical changes that took place in the
social sciences towards the middle of the 19th century, when the
doctrine of social homogeneity was abandoned. Authors as diverse as
Burke, Rousseau, or Smith, to cite but a few examples, held that the
natural equality of human beings was an irrefutable principle.
Inequality—both by those who condemned it and by those who
legitimized it—was in fact considered by all as a socioeconomic fact,
the product of historical evolution and of the social institutions.10
Around the middle of the 19th century, instead, as the anthropology
historian Marvin Harris has observed, there was no more “self evident
truth” than the fact that all men were created unequal.11 Inequality
among individuals began to be held to be an objective and natural fact
of a biological order as, indeed, was “the ‘fact’ that certain races were
superior to others” (Hawkins 1997: 184). Toward the middle of the
century, these ideas were widespread among the European intelligen-
tsia, thanks above all to the literary fortune of the ideas vulgarized by
Gobineau on the inequality and on the hierarchy of the human races
(Battini 1995: 196). The theory of races formulated by Gobineau
between 1853 and 1855 in his Essay sur l’inegalité des races humaines
is without doubt an important juncture, as is recognized by the
founders, for the birth of social anthropology.12
Ammon and Lapouge nonetheless make a leap in quality, in respect
to Gobineau, in trying to give racism a scientific basis.13 The distinction
between races is in fact anchored on quantifiable empirical data,
namely, the cephalic index.14 Both Ammon and Lapouge used it to
divide the European population into three fundamental racial types:
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the Homo Europaeus, the Homo Alpinus, and the Homo Medit-
teraneus. Homo Europaeus had a lower cephalic index—that is
dolichocephalic, with a long narrow skull—and is normally tall, light-
skinned, and blond-haired; Homo Alpinus is instead brachycephalic,
dark, and shorter in stature; Homo Meditteraneus, finally, although
dolichocephalic, is also darker and shorter in stature and is found
exclusively in the Mediterranean basin. The principal innovation intro-
duced by the anthroposociologists “lay in the qualitative characteris-
tics [they] associated with these head shapes” (Hecht 1999: 4).
Dolichocephalic and brachycephalic individuals would in fact have
different aptitudes, predispositions, and intellects that underlay their
different social and cultural performance. Homo Europaeus, called
aryan by Lapouge and teutonic by Ammon, was supposed to be
active, enterprising, and ambitious, with a marked tendency to migrate
and a singular attraction toward urban life; Homo Alpinus was instead
more static, mostly concentrated in the agricultural centers, and little
inclined to change and innovation.15 The correlation identified
between the cephalic index and human capabilities, the outcome of a
titanic effort in measuring and cataloguing by Ammon and Lapouge,16
was the proof, in their opinion, of the “scientific” nature of their
racism. The hierarchy of races guessed at by Gobineau would there-
fore have found confirmation in anthrosociological research intended
to demonstrate that even the qualitative differences between individu-
als could be traced back to quantitative, measurable facts.17 These
ideas were then formulated into a theory of social stratification, to be
dealt with later, based on the correlation between socioeconomic
status and racial stock.
Besides being based on the idea “that human racial differences are
real, significant and scientifically measurable” (Leonard 2003: 689),
Ammon and Lapouge’s anthropology also postulates that these differ-
ences can be inherited. In the wake of Galton, Ammon and Lapouge
in fact maintain that “genius” and “intelligence,” no less than physical
features, have a biological foundation and are therefore transmittable
through heredity. The concept frame for this biological determinism is
that set out by Galton with the distinction between “nature” and
“nurture.”18 The social context has no power to modify the individual
and racial differences that derive from “innate characteristics” and
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from biology. The condemnation Ammon and Lapouge make of those
currents of Social Darwinism that accept the Lamarckian theory of the
capacity to inherit acquired characteristics springs from this. The two
anthropologists believed that education and social context do not
have a role in the evolution of the races, not being able to produce
real effects that could be transmitted to descendants.
A further component of social anthropology is natural selection.19
The elimination of the least fit is a fundamental process in nature,
which, nonetheless, works in a flawed and more complex fashion in
human societies. “Natural selection” is transformed in fact into “social
selection,” “in the measure in which social context exercises its influ-
ence on the natural environment.”20 Contrasts between natural selec-
tion and social selection can occur, above all, when social institutions
favor the proliferation of the mediocre and hinder the reproduction of
the superior individual.21 In modern society, in particular, norms and
social practices that are in contrast to the bettering of the race
prevail.22 The brachycephalic individuals, despite being intellectually
and socially “inferior,” have major reproductive powers and greater
adaptability to social norms. From this derives the possibility that the
brachycephalics will end by replacing the dolichocephalics through
selection of a complex order, both biological and social.23 Lapouge
invoked in this context “an anthropological analogue to Gresham’s
law in economics, according to which good coin was driven out of
circulation by bad coin: when two races were mixed, the inferior
would eventually predominate over the superior” (Hawkins 1997:
192).
The only way to invert the tendency toward biological decadence
was that of eugenics.24 Both Ammon and Lapouge came to maintain
the necessity of the physical elimination of the “inferior” subjects, a
task that, if not carried out by natural selection, would have to be
performed by the state. The two anthropologists believed in this case
that by catering to the predisposition of the inferior individual, such an
aim could be easily pursued. The establishment of places particularly
attractive to him or her—where alcohol could be distributed free,
where vice could be spread, and libertine behavior favored—would in
fact have led to a concentration of degenerate individuals who could
easily be eliminated.25 Naturally, such a project could never be carried
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out under a liberal organization of society, which therefore had to give
place to a centralized and state-controlled model of socialism (or
National Socialism), aimed at bringing into being the real principles of
the social hierarchy. “Substituting current humanity with a unique and
perfect race” needs, Lapouge wrote, “almost of necessity, a socialist
regime”; this requires, however, overcoming the traditional concept
of socialism, which has “shown itself up to now to be prevalently
leveling and detrimental.”26
These are the principal traits of Ammon and Lapouge’s social
anthropology, a new racist theory that European and American culture
at the end of the 19th century received as “scientific,” “erudite,” and
“revolutionary.”27 The early diffusion is, in truth, circumscribed to
France and Germany, where the two anthropologists worked. The first
articles by Lapouge, appearing “in the major French anthropological
publications from the mid 1880s to the mid 1890s” (Schneider 1990:
62), had scarce resonance outside France, as did the German-language
publications by Ammon in the early 1890s. Things changed after 1895
for two reasons: first because anthroposociological theories began to
cross the confines of the discipline of anthropology, finding accep-
tance even in the economic and sociological journals;28 and second
because the echo of the anthroposociological doctrines was amplified
thanks to their diffusion through journals in the English language.
Lapouge’s and Ammon’s theories had by then gained “an aura of
scientific respectability” (Weiss 1987: 93–94) recognized at the inter-
national level. As pointed out by Poliakov, when leafing through the
journals and the publications of the time, one is convinced that
anthroposociology “was very much taken seriously. Certainly Lapouge
led the way, above all in Germany, where Kaiser Wilhelm II cham-
pioned him as ‘the only great Frenchman’; but he had advocates in
other European countries too” (1971: 306).
II
Carlos C. Closson and the Spread of Social Anthropology
in Economic Journals
A SIGN OF THE incredible good fortune of social anthropology is the
resonance this doctrine enjoyed in the major economic reviews,29 fed
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by an incessant publicity campaign conducted by Carlos C. Closson.
We know very little of the meteoric academic career of Closson. He
received his A.B. from Harvard University in 1892 and his A.M. in
1893.30 After a fellowship in social science at Harvard, he was
appointed instructor in Advanced Economics at the University of
Chicago in 1894. He held the position until 189631 and, when he left,
“Veblen was assigned the ‘theory’ courses, which were required for
advanced degrees” (Dorfman [1934] 1947: 132). Closson declared
himself a disciple of Lapouge, and he taught courses on “social
selection” at Chicago (Hecht 2003: 122). Between 1895 and 1900,
Closson’s publishing activity was intense. He translated some of
Ammon’s and Lapouge’s fundamental contributions for the English-
language journals and published many essays himself on anthroposo-
ciology and social selection. But after 1900, the name of Closson
suddenly vanished from any social and economic debates. His dis-
appearance was as precipitous as the decline of what he ultimately
called anthroposociology. What became of him in the new century is
puzzling. We know only that he moved to Los Angeles and undertook
a career as a businessman.32 Thus it would seem that academic
teaching and his scholarly activity were only a parenthesis in Closson’s
life.
The fortune of social anthropology in the economic journals
appears in truth to be circumscribed to a limited time. The economic
journals, in fact, acted as a sounding board for Ammon’s and
Lapouge’s theories for only five years, from 1896 to 1900. With the
beginning of the new century, the debate over social anthropology
ceased suddenly, perhaps also due to some economists distancing
themselves from it and its subsequent delegitimization.
Social anthropology held the limelight in the 1896 economic debate,
with the publication of no fewer than four articles by Closson and the
translation, by the same, of Ammon’s work. Initially, Closson defined
the new scientific approach as “the selectionist school of social
sciences” (1896a: 156) in virtue of the key role played by the concept
of “selection”; a few months later he began to talk of “social-
anthropology” to underline the strict links between the new discipline
and sociology, economics, and politics;33 from 1897, the term
“anthro[po]-sociology” begins to appear, which is the term destined to
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consecrate the new school of Lapouge, Ammon, and Closson himself.
Even among economists, social anthropology is presented as a “new”
science, capable of unifying data and knowledge coming from disci-
plinary areas hitherto far distant. Its claim to be scientific rests on the
ample use of empirical and statistical data and on its ability to
enunciate universal laws deducted from that data. Therefore, the
American economist underlines “the importance of the new science of
anthroposociology for the whole range of the social sciences” but,
above all, its repercussions in the “sociological field, from which,
precisely, there derives its denomination as ‘anthropo-sociology’ ”
(1898: 254–255).
Closson’s contribution, which forms an effective summary of the
thoughts of Ammon and Lapouge, addresses two principal questions:
one begins with the process of separation that pushes individuals
possessing different characteristics in the racial sense to form distinct
social groups; the other deals with social selection and its relationship
with natural selection. From the former point of view, the American
economist highlights how the diverse aptitudes of the human race are
transformed into a division within society, both on a hierarchic plane
(“disassociation by stratification”) and on a geographic one (“disasso-
ciation by displacement”). In both cases, social mechanisms act and
lead to the separation of dolichocephalic subjects from brachycephalic
ones: in the first case, through a concentration of the former into the
higher classes of society; in the second, through the migratory phe-
nomenon, leading to a concentration of the dolichocephalic in the
cities. The underlying origin of this diversity of performance is held to
be a biological fact: on the one hand, the fact that Homo Europaeus,
or dolichocephalic, “seems to be superior in general psychic ability
and character” and is therefore destined “to the higher position in the
process of social stratification”;34 on the other hand, the greater
enterprise and aggressivity of Homo Europaeus would explain his
major mobility compared to the brachycephalics, more given to the
rural life.35
The second theme dealt with by Closson touches the center of one
of the key concepts of social anthropology, that is, selection. The 1896
publication of Lapouge’s volume entitled Les sélections sociales
led Closson to write a well-constructed summary in the Journal of
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Political Economy. Lapouge’s disciple started by indicating the princi-
pal aims of natural selection, which consist of the elimination of
degenerate individuals and the perfection of the superior elements. As
has already been said, however, the complexity of human society in
general generates a contrast between natural selection and social
selection. In society, in fact, selection at times inverts these aims.
Closson indicates two principal forces that operate in society: the
conservative force of biological heredity, which tends to perpetuate
the same physical characteristics from generation to generation; and
the evolutionary force of selection, which introduces changes and
establishes which species have to progress and which to disappear
(1896d: 453). These two forces act on the races, and the second in
particular “is the great force in altering the quality of the population.”
This bettering, however, does not come about thanks to the action of
the institutional environment but happens exclusively on the racial
plane. Closson emphasizes one of the pillars of anthroposociology,
that is, the sterility of “nurture”: “[E]ducation has only a limited effect
upon the single individual and even this effect is not in any appre-
ciable degree transmitted to his descendants; it cannot be relied upon
as the primary means of human improvement.” The work of selection
must therefore be such as to favor the development of the “ethnically
superior elements,” something that does not always happen because
of the institutions and the social norms that have ended up by favoring
the proliferation of the “inferior classes” (1896d: 459–462).
On this occasion Closson picks up on what truly obsesses Lapouge,
that is, the danger of a deterioration of the race. Faithfully reporting
the passages from Lapouge, the American economist indicates the two
directions in which selection must proceed: “(1) to eliminate the
degenerate, vicious and incapable elements, (2) to increase and
perfect the superior element” (1896d: 565). There are naturally diffi-
culties of a moral and social order that hinder the carrying out of a
similar objective, above all, the need to impose a “social” control over
the mechanisms of reproduction. Closson, however, held that such
reforms were necessary “in the highest interests of human welfare.”
Singularly, the American economist is silent regarding the radical
solutions prospected by Ammon and Lapouge, who, as we have seen,
outlined the features of a National Socialist society in which the
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question of the suppression of “inferior” individuals became a matter
of state. His conclusion is nonetheless perfectly in line with the two
founders of social anthropology. Without indicating the means that
would allow them to reach their objectives, he enunciates the eugenic
aims set out by the social anthropologists, toward which the action of
social selection should be directed:
(1) to constitute a natural aristocracy among a given people; (2) to
constitute specialized and distinct castes suited for the different branches of
social works, (3) to transform a whole people in a given direction, (4) to
form a universal dominant race, (5) to improve all humanity by utilizing the
most perfect local types, (6) to substitute for existing humanity a single
more perfect race, etc. (Closson 1896d: 465)
In the closing years of the century, the publishing activity of Closson
continued to be intense (see Closson 1898, 1899a, 1899b, 1900a,
1900b, 1900c). Thanks to his numerous contributions, the American
economist earned his stripes as the American representative of the
school of the so-called anthroposociologists; in the economic litera-
ture of the period, that school was usually identified with the names
of Ammon, Closson, and Lapouge (see Ripley 1900). We owe the
English translations of the most important contributions of Ammon
and Lapouge, which allowed the English-speaking public to have
direct contact with the thoughts of the two anthropologists, to Closson
himself.36 We will return to these shortly, concentrating our attention
above all on the concept of the social and economic hierarchies
formulated by Otto Ammon. The German anthropologist’s theory is in
fact of a certain importance and can in part be extrapolated from the
eugenic and racist context in which it was formulated. It should not
surprise us that such a theory has been revived, even in recent years,
centering as it does on a problem that is still today at the hub of the
social and economic debate.
III
The Statistical Basis of the Social and Economic Hierarchies
TOGETHER WITH Lapouge’s book from 1896 on social selection, the
volume written by Ammon in 1895, The Social Order and its Natural
Bases, is without doubt one of the most representative of the social
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and political philosophy of the anthroposociologists. The indefatigable
Closson translated the first part of the book in the Journal of Political
Economy in 1896,37 integrating the writing with notes and personal
paragraphs. In this essay, Ammon expounds a statistical model to
explain the social and economic hierarchies that were destined to
enjoy great success in the history of the social sciences.
From this perspective, Ammon is within a tradition of research that
had illustrious precursors. In fact, we owe to Adolphe Quetelet and
Francis Galton the earliest use of the normal law of errors as an
instrument for describing the aptitudes and mental capacities of an
individual. Right from his earliest book in 1835, Sur l’homme . . . , ou
essay de physique sociale, Quetelet had presented data relative not only
to the weight or height of human beings but also concerning intellectual
capacity, moral traits, or specific social predispositions (for example,
toward crime). Organizing the data in the form of frequency distribu-
tion, he had shown how all these characteristics revealed the typical
form of the Gaussian curve, that is, symmetrically disposed around the
mean value (or rather, that which in the repeated observation of any
given phenomenon, for example, an astronomical one, corresponds to
the correct value).38 Quetelet interpreted such “bell-shaped” distribu-
tion of human aptitudes just as he interpreted the curve of the errors in
astronomical observation. He then had recourse to these data to deduce
the idea of the “average man,” that is, the entity that social physics
should have dealt with (Gordon 1991: 530–531).
Galton took Quetelet’s discussion even further, concentrating his
attention prominently on the distribution of the “qualitative” charac-
teristics (genius, intelligence, capacity, etc.). In his Hereditary Genius
(1869), the English statistician had in fact assumed that talent was
distributed normally and that deviations from the mean followed the
Gaussian law of errors (1869: xi). Availing himself of the same formula
used by Quetelet,39 he had estimated the number of persons belong-
ing to the diverse social classes, ordered in ascending order starting
from the class of “true idiots and imbeciles” up to the class of the
“geniuses.” The result was a symmetric representation aimed at dem-
onstrating “the vast abundance of mediocrity (i.e., the standard of
intellectual power)” and “the rarity of commanding ability” (1869:
30–31). The fact that the law of errors had one of its most evident
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manifestations in the human world was, in his opinion, due on the
one hand to the action of natural selection and on the other to
heredity. Through natural selection, the physical and intellectual char-
acteristics that were best suited to the species ended up by becoming
mean average characteristics, according to modalities very similar to
those described by Quetelet in his works of social physics. Heredity
contributed then to reinforcing this dynamic, operating in such a way
that the talents and the aptitudes of the individuals as well as their
physical characteristics were subject to the normal distribution. With
his starting point as the idea that intelligence was transmissible
only through heredity, Galton therefore stated the need for a new
science—eugenics—that would be able to better the “mental qualities”
of individuals through control over the mechanics of reproduction.
In trying to demonstrate the normal distribution of human capaci-
ties, neither Quetelet nor Galton had extended their research to the
field of income distribution. Only incidentally did they mention the
fact that such a distribution mirrored the personal distribution of
earnings and wealth.40 Ammon’s objective was precisely that of filling
this gap. On the one hand, he insisted that the intuition by Galton and
Quetelet of the normal distribution of aptitude was well-founded; on
the other, he set himself to demonstrating how such a distribution
perfectly corresponds to the distribution of earnings and wealth.
On the first point Ammon uses a statistic artifice, considered as able
to give Galton’s theory even more foundation. The English scholar had
assumed a priori that the distribution of aptitude was normal; Ammon
instead proposed a simulation that was intended to demonstrate the
statistic process that generates such a distribution, which would find
confirmation also in the theories of probability. The German anthro-
pologist imagined that the gifts of each individual concern four distinct
areas: intellectual, moral, economic, and physical. He then supposed
a scale of evaluation from 1 to 6 for each of these areas, in which 1
is the minimum aptitude value and 6 is the maximum. Evidently
excellence will correspond to a combination of six points in all four
areas (for a total of 24), while inferiority is measured by one point in
each area (a total of four points).
Thanks to the theory of probability, Ammon continued, it is possible
to know the type of distribution that would prevail in this hypothetical
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community. It is sufficient to think of dice, of the “throwing” of four
data, each of which represent the intellectual, moral, economic, and
physical traits of the individual. The number of all the possible
combinations (6 ¥ 6 ¥ 6 ¥ 6 = 1,296) is equal to the total population.
The lowest probability (1/1296) will be associated both with the
combination with the highest total score (24)41 and with the combi-
nation with the lowest score (4).42 The two cases correspond to the
extremes of the social scale, that is, to the individuals who are more
gifted, on the one hand, and to the those who are totally bereft of
intellectual, social, and physical aptitude, on the other. An ever-
increasing frequency will be found for the intermediary combinations,
with the probability and the maximum frequency associated with
the average value (which in the case hypothesized corresponds to the
sum of 14, which can be realized by 146 different combinations). The
correspondence between the statistical significance of the experiment
and its economic and social relevance was, in Ammon’s opinion, quite
evident:
The number of extremely high throws, as well as of extremely low ones,
is comparatively small, while the average or nearly average throws appear
very frequently. Directed toward our present subject, this signified that the
number of men of genius and high talent is relatively small, because in
accordance with the mathematical laws, the necessary combination of traits
can appear only seldom. Correspondingly, the number of the weak-
minded and of the imbecile is relatively small, while the number of those
of about average ability is far in excess of that of the two extremes.
(Ammon 1896: 209–219)
A graphic representation of such distribution would appear similar
to that obtained by Galton from the Gaussian formula of errors (see
Figure 1).43 Ammon, however, considered a partial modification of the
figure to be necessary to make it conform more to what he believed
to be the real form of the “social pyramid.”
Two important aspects stand out: in the first place, the substitution
proposed by Ammon of the image of the pyramid with a figure similar
to that of an “onion,” considered to be more appropriate in repre-
senting the “true” form of social stratification; in the second place, the
expediency of avoiding the lowest part of the curve to underline the
imperfect symmetry of the social hierarchy. The solution proposed by
the German anthropologist arose from his conviction that natural
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selection eliminates subjects with excessively low aptitudes, consid-
ered insufficient to survive in society.44 The lower limit of the social
hierarchy commences in fact after the line that Ammon defined as the
“limit of social utilization.”
Ammon’s reasoning proceeded with what is perhaps the earliest
attempt to demonstrate the coincidence between the “intelligence
curve” and the “wealth curve,” a hypothesis already outlined by
Galton but without the necessary support of the statistics of incomes.
Using these fiscal statistics,45 the German anthropologist superimposed
the Galtonian curve of ability on the curve of the distribution of
incomes, revealing a notable correspondence between the two curves.
The economic and social stratification illustrated by the statistics on
incomes is therefore held to be the reflection of the diverse combi-
nations of the aptitudes possessed by the individuals. Ammon there-
fore concluded that that “two truths” emerge from the comparison of
the two curves:
(1) that the form of the curve of incomes (except at the base) very nearly
coincides with Galton’s curve of the distribution of ability, and (2) that the
income curve is not symmetrical above and below but corresponds more
Figure 1
Ammon’s Social Pyramid
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nearly to what we have called the “true form of the social pyramid” . . .
which like the income curve, stands upon a horizontal base line. (Ammon
1896: 226)
As we have seen, up to this point Ammon’s reasoning seems to be
free of racial connotations. His conceptual model decrees only the
inevitability of a hierarchical organization of society without giving any
indication as to the subjects who should occupy the different rungs on
the social scale. We could even deduce that such distribution is
governed by “chance.” The fact that the number of more gifted
individuals (and, as such, at the apex of the social-economic hierarchy)
is limited is the exclusive outcome of the laws of statistical probability.
In Ammon’s concept, however, natural selection does not “play at dice,”
to paraphrase a celebrated aphorism. The model is therefore led back
to a framework of biological determinism. The superiority of the
individual at the apex of the social hierarchy is not only due to the fact
that “the average ability among the higher classes is more favorable than
among the lower” but also, and above all, to the fact that “this difference
rests upon a hereditary base.” It is not therefore a case of casual
extraction by chance that assigns to each individual his or her proper
stock of aptitudes, but instead the individual’s descent from a bloodline
with determinate biological characteristics.
The statistical model elaborated by Ammon is supported by “The
Fundamental Laws of Anthropo-Sociology,” as the title of the essay
published by Lapouge in the Journal of Political Economy in 1897 tells
us. The essay summarizes the principal findings by Lapouge, Ammon,
and Closson, transformed into a long list of social laws. Two of these
are of particular importance: (1) the law of the distribution of wealth,
and (2) the law of stratification. They permit “the filling in” of the
stylized representation of the social hierarchies proposed by Ammon
with the different racial types.
The first law states the major quota of wealth possessed by the
dolichocephalic subjects.46 This theory is supported by Lapouge with
numerous tables and correlation indexes that were meant to show the
evidence of a major financial contribution in the areas where the
Homo Europeaus or Aryan type was dominant. This is the sign, in
the opinion of the French anthropologist, of the diverse “economic
efficiency” of the races. The correlation indexes in particular
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“demonstrate the economic, and especially the commercial, superior-
ity of Homo Europaeus” (Lapouge 1897: 63). Lapouge stated that the
law has a universal nature when a comparison is made between
dolichocephalic and brachicephalic populations. On the other hand,
the existence of a correlation between the cephalic index and wealth
in those countries composed almost exclusively by dolichocephalic
subjects was still controversial. In such a case it would not in fact
be a comparision between Homo Europaeus and Homo Alpinus but
“between different degrees of dolichocephaly among the former racial
element” (1897: 66). The formulation of the law with greater univer-
sality is therefore that which states “in the countries where Homo
Europaeus predominates, wealth is in general the greatest (England,
the United States, Holland, etc.)” (1897: 66).
The second law concerns social stratification. It states, independently
of the degree of wealth, that dolichocephalic subjects have higher social
status.47 That is, there would seem to be a “correlation between race and
social position,” proven by the correspondence between the cephalic
index “and the profession of the individuals concerned” (1897: 87). It is
evident that if social status runs side by side with income and wealth,
then the law of the distribution of wealth and the law of stratification are
no less than two faces of the same coin. The superimposition of the
curve of ability and the curve of incomes proposed by Ammon intends,
in fact, to demonstrate, as we have seen, exactly the convergence of the
economic hierarchy with the social hierarchy. The two laws of anthro-
posociology tell us in substance that we will find the Homo Europaeus
or Aryan at the apex of both hierarchies.48
Lapouge mentions finally a variant on the laws of distribution of
wealth and stratification: “the law of the intellectual classes.” This law
does not have recourse to the cephalic index, but to a measure that
had notable success prior to the research of Lapouge and Ammon and
that was subsequently abandoned. The law of the intellectual classes
was formulated by posing a strict correlation between the dimension
of the cranium and the intellectual profession.49 In this case, too,
Lapouge did not consider that the greater dimensions of the head are
an acquired characteristic; he considered instead that this is a biologi-
cal fact that is reproduced through heredity in the circles of the
intellectual elite:
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The greater size of the head among the intellectual classes is not due to an
expansion of the brain by its training and activity, the difference is,
according to my own researches, quite as marked between young children
of the intellectual classes as between adult members of the same groups.
(Lapouge 1897: 90)
Thus, the essential data of the anthroposociological theories are
always the hereditary nature of intellectual, social, and economic
superiority. Environment, education, and in general the social institu-
tions are factors that are irrelevant in this concept frame. Ammon,
Lapouge, and Closson continuously reiterate that “nurture” succumbs
to the laws of “nature” (in particular, that of biological heredity). The
individuals found on the lower levels of the social scale must not
attribute their status to the institutions that underpin society, but
exclusively to their insufficient genetic gifts.50
Social organization, however, maintains an important role from the
eugenic point of view, in that it can ease or hinder the perfection of
the race. As we have already said, this is the principal obsession of the
anthroposociologists. The model of society they appeal to in order to
avoid this danger is expressly anti-democratic and illiberal. Ammon,
no less than Lapouge, states that the organization of the hierarchy has
to crystallize into separate “social classes” in such a way that marriage
and reproduction of the species takes place between individuals of the
same status. “Nature,” writes the German anthropologist, “commends
the union of like and like” (Ammon 1896: 235). The principal cause
of the deterioration of the race is “panmixia,” or the “crossing” of
individuals with different genetic gifts. A stable distinction between
social classes—“the most remarkable [institution] which the evolution
of social life has produced”—instead reduces such a danger, “and
thereby makes possible a much more frequent production of highly
endowed individuals” (1896: 233–234).
Each attempt to modify the social stratification, improving the
conditions of the more poverty-stricken classes, would in fact have
deleterious effects; it would stimulate panmixia, lethal to the positive
destiny of the race. “Ammon used the opinions and language of
Weismann and Galton to support his claim that the various social
classes represented a necessary form of natural selection, and should
be preserved intact at all costs” (Weiss 1987: 95). According to the
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social anthropologists, egalitarian ideas51 in fact represented the great-
est peril for the human race, destined to precipitate into a nightmare
of mediocrity:
If social distinctions could be abolished and if men ceased to marry
preferably within their class, the consequence would be a marked dimi-
nution in successive generations in the proportion of individuals of high
endowment. There would be correspondingly a decrease in the proportion
of those of exceptionally weak capacity, and the result would be even
greater proportion than at present of persons of mediocre or average
ability. (Ammon 1896: 236–237)
The model of representation of the social hierarchies furnished
by the anthroposociologists, cleansed of its racial content, furnishes
important suggestions for economists and statisticians. It is in fact one
of the earliest models in which emphasis is placed on a “personal”
distribution of income and wealth. It is not by chance that Vilfredo
Pareto, an author who is traditionally remembered as being the first to
make that step from “functional” distribution to “personal” distribu-
tion, was strongly influenced by the anthropological literature of the
end of the century, even if he distanced himself from it.
IV
A Sympathetic Critic: Vilfredo Pareto
THE RECEPTION TO the anthroposociological theories given by Vilfredo
Pareto is a question of a certain importance. He is probably alone
among economists in giving ample space to the discussion of the
theories of Ammon and Lapouge, albeit in a mix of dissent and
approbation. Pareto will never come to explicitly take up “racial” and
“eugenic” positions; however, his social anthropology is strongly
indebted to the concepts formulated by the founders of the discipline.
The concepts of “social heterogeneity,” “social selection,” and “circu-
lation of the elite” to which he has frequent recourse in his work in
fact owe much to Ammon and Lapouge, as he himself, in fact,
recognized on more than one occasion. Pareto’s theory is widely
known; therefore, discussion here will be limited to those aspects that
in various ways recall the anthroposociological theories.
The idea of social heterogeneity constitutes one of the pillars of the
Paretian concept of social hierarchies (Spengler 1944). After having
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formulated his famous “income curve,” Pareto explained the con-
stancy of such curve in time, using a minimum of economic argu-
ments. To understand the reasons underlying the unequal division of
wealth, which shows up in a universal form in every type of society,
economic theory has to give way to anthropology or to “social
physiology,” as the last chapter of the Cours calls it. The fact that
“intelligence,” “ability,” “aptitude,” or, more generally, “the psychical
and physiological” qualities of individuals are distributed in such a
way that “some possess . . . in a more eminent way than others,” is
due to social heterogeneity. This creates the hierarchies of income and
wealth typical of all human societies, which are not due to institutional
causes, like “education received” or the “social condition” of the
family (Pareto 1896–1897, II: 390).
Pareto expressly declared that he was inspired, in expounding the
“doctrine of social heterogeneity,” by the writings of “Ammon,
Lapouge and other anthropologists” (Pareto 1896: 443). He, however,
distanced himself from the racist implications of those theories. The
author of the Cours believed that the factual data on which
the doctrine of the hierarchies of race was constructed were still
insufficient:
Nothing authorises us to consider the form of the cranium or the colour of
the hair or eyes as exclusive characteristics, for differentiating the human
races. For many anthropologists the existence of a race of blonde doli-
chocephalics much superior to the darker brachycephalic races, which are
qualified as “inferior races,” is an article of faith. Facts which are numeri-
cally scant, often badly observed and forced correlations are adduced as
proof. (Pareto 1896–1897, II: 396).
The merit attributed to Ammon and Lapouge is that of having
banished the “egalitarian” prejudice and of having brought the irre-
ducible diversity of individuals to the center of attention. Their error
lay in wishing to reduce that heterogeneity solely to “race” and to
having understood the ethnic element as the only factor in historical
explanation.52 The “doctrine of social heterogeneity” was therefore
correct when it stated that there are “innate” differences between
individuals from which the unequal distribution of wealth arises. But
it was in error when it stated that these differences derive from the
“race,” “class,” or “caste” the individual belongs to.53
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The concept of “social selection” was also discussed by Pareto in
comparison with Ammon and Lapouge. For Pareto, “selection” had a
“double scope”; on the one hand, it places the individual in an
appropriate position in the social hierarchy; on the other, it eliminates
those inept and incapable subjects that could undermine the survival
of the social aggregate (Pareto 1901–1902: 541). As concerns the first
goal, Pareto held that it could be reached by allowing the laws of the
market and competition to act. Reaching the second goal of selection
is more complex: “There are individuals who can be decidedly del-
eterious and dangerous for society”; selection should impede “their
being reproduced in their descendants” (Pareto 1901–1902: 540–542).
It would be dangerous if the “human race” were not subject to the law
of “selection”; it could not then save itself from “decline” (Pareto 1906:
312). The problem is naturally “how” to eliminate elements that are
held to be “inferior.”
Like Ammon and Lapouge, Pareto underlined the contrast between
natural selection and social selection. The first operates in a “direct”
fashion, eliminating the “inferior elements” and impeding “their being
reproduced in their descendants” (Pareto 1901–1902: 542). In human
societies, this form of selection is hindered by social institutions that
allow individuals destined by nature not to survive to do so. In
Pareto’s eyes, reforms of a “social” character inspired by humanitari-
anism and by sentimentalism stop selection from carrying out its
proper function. From this perspective, there is a total communion of
opinion with Ammon and Lapouge. The humanitarians and reformers,
Pareto writes, “desperately” pursue the aim of “the betterment of
individuals of inferior quality,” not realizing that “every hope held in
this regard has always been deluded” (Pareto 1896–1897, II: 552).
Their error arises from not wanting to
admit that in the human species, as in all the other living species,
individuals are not born equal, they have different character, and certain
individuals are adapted to the environment in which they live, others no.
It is easy to believe what one wants. Humanitarians do not study the real
world as it is, they create an imaginary world, one which their sentiments
desire.54
His condemnation of the institutions that hinder selection does not,
however, signify that Pareto was willing to accept the model of society
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proposed by Ammon and Lapouge. On the contrary, he expressed his
regret that “a distinguished soul like Lapouge” had come to imagine
such radical solutions for carrying out the “selection of the race” as the
physical elimination of the inferior elements and the imposition of
sexual duty and reproduction only on the “eugenics.” This prospect
appeared to Pareto to be totally “repugnant” (Pareto 1896–1897, II:
394).
He showed his approval instead for the “indirect” methods of
suppression of the “inferior individuals”: the penal system of reclusion
and suppression of the perilous individuals; the different mortality
rates and birth rates of the different social classes that contribute to
suppressing “in a great number the majority of weak and malformed
individuals”; the habits of vice that attract degenerate individuals, such
as alcoholism, that accelerate their “degeneration” and that of their
descendants. These are “means” that are still “very imperfect” but that
nonetheless contribute in an indirect fashion to reaching the goal of
selection; that is, the suppression of the unfit.
A further use of the concept of social selection was made by Pareto
in discussing the problem of the form of the income curve. In contrast
to Ammon, the author of the Cours did not consider that the income
curve presents analogies with the normal or error curve. He did not
even believe that these could be generated by chance, as Ammon
implicitly supposed with his statistic simulation based on the throw of
the dice. Pareto thought, on the contrary, that the income curve is
much more asymmetric and compressed toward the lower part than
the normal one.55 The experiment simulated by Ammon through the
casting of dice needed to be rectified, attributing a lesser probability
to the dice face with the higher value, and vice versa. In a letter to
Ammon in 1900, Pareto wrote:
In the II volume of my Cours d’èconomie politique . . . I was able to
demonstrate that the distribution of income does not depend solely on
chance, but presupposes a certain law of heterogeneity among individuals.
As you will see this leaves your conclusions unchanged. All that is
necessary is to substitute a uniform distribution of heterogeneity with a
distribution according to a given law. In other words, the dice of which
you speak are not simple cubes with faces 1-2-3-4-5-6. They are instead
polyhedrons having, for example, three faces marked 1, two faces marked
2, one marked 3 etc, all according to the given law.56
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According to Pareto, this device would have permitted the formu-
lation of a statistical law that conformed to the real trend of income
distribution in a greater degree, in particular to a distribution that was
highly asymmetric, flattened in the lower part of the curve. The fact
that it did not coincide with the distribution of the abilities, usually
normal and symmetric, was due precisely to the action of social
selection.
According to Pareto, there was a lower limit beyond which it was
not possible to descend that was absent from the upper part of the
scale:
Indeed, of two individuals who deviate equally from the mean of the
quality, the one who has exceptional aptitudes for making money may
have a very high income; but the one who has qualities equally different
from the mean but in the negative direction, cannot, without dying, drop
below the minimum income sufficient to sustain life. (Pareto 1906: 284)
Under the minimum income for life, the selective process operates,
and eliminates the inferior elements. This explains why individuals
who possess aptitudes much below the average do not appear in the
income statistics—precisely due to their inability to reach subsistence
level. To subsist in the lower areas of the social and economic
hierarchy in substance, one needs abilities that are at least near
average, since those much inferior would activate the mechanisms of
selection. Pareto’s use of the concept of “selection” to explain the
asymmetry of the income curve is therefore in line with Ammon’s;57
there is, however, a fundamental difference concerning the idea that
distribution can be considered in the same way as a casual process,
that is, subject to the laws of statistical probability.58
Further agreement between Pareto and the anthroposociologists
regards a concept that mirrors “selection” or, rather, “stability.” Both
concepts are taken from the work of Lapouge, in part reformulated by
Pareto. As we have seen from the summary in the article by Closson,
Lapouge identified “conservation and evolution” as opposing forces
that hold society up. The discussion among anthroposociologists
turned principally on the biological mechanisms of the transmission of
the racial stock, while Pareto interpreted this process on the economic
and social plane, analyzing the effects of the patrimonial heredity.
“Stability,” according to Pareto, contributes to “crystallizing” all the
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social relations, as happens in societies where there are “rigidly
constituted castes”; “selection” lies instead at the origins of social
dynamism. The combination of the two principles is what character-
izes the “modern societies,” given that here operate both “the element
of stability,” guaranteed “by private property and inheritance,” and
“the elements of change and selection” from which comes “[t]he
opportunity everyone has to rise as far as he can in the social
hierarchy.”59
The different evaluation of the role of selection and of conservation
emerges above all in the celebrated Paretian theory of the circulation
of the elite. In this case, too, Pareto drew numerous concepts from
anthropological literature, as he himself admitted. To the insinuations
that his theory plagarized ideas of Gaetano Mosca, the author of the
Cours responded:
I have taken nothing from Mosca. On the other hand I have taken a great
deal, as I have clearly stated, . . . from Ammon and a little also from
Lapouge. Scholars can see moreover where I dissent from them and what
I have added.60
The declaration by Pareto is unequivocal: He recognized that he took
important notions from the theories of the anthroposociologists while
dissenting from them on many decisive questions. For the circulation
of the elite, the author of the Cours owed much to the “school” of
Lapouge, even if the implications that he drew go in a completely
different direction.
The first fundamental element of dissent concerns the identification
of the “chosen” individuals, a term that echoes the concept of
“chosen” race from Gobineau and the anthroposociologists, but that
Pareto expunged of its racial significance. Pareto wrote that “by
‘chosen subjects’ we simply intend individuals whose activity in life is
more intense” (Pareto 1896–1897, II: 416). Therefore, until there are
more reliable data,61 the idea that the “chosen subjects” posses specific
anthropological characteristics must be abandoned:
Ammon and Lapouge specify too much when they wish to give us the
anthropological characteristics of this elite, of this eugenic race, identifying
it with the blonde dolichocephalics. For now, this point remains obscure,
and long study is still necessary, before we can establish if the psychic
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capabilities of the elite are matched by exterior, anthropometrical charac-
teristics and for us to know precisely what these characteristics are. (Pareto
1901–1902: 133)
Having denied that it is anthropological characteristics that identify
the elite, Pareto specified that recognition cannot but be based on
their capabilities and their actions. The operation of market forces, in
particular, was considered by the author of the Cours to be the least
imperfect mechanism that human society had discovered for “select-
ing” the most capable individuals. This process would certainly be
more simple if one wanted to give credit to Lapouge’s theories of the
elect race, given that the subjects destined for high positions could
easily be identified on the basis of their facial features.62
Radically different from the anthroposociological theories is the
Paretian concept of social mobility. The idea that individuals coming
from the “lower” ranks can contaminate the aristocracies was turned
upside down by Pareto. If there were not this “turnover,” society
would be destined to perish. It is precisely the subjects coming from
the lower classes that allow the social system to continually renew
itself. Social selection runs counter to the idea championed by
Lapouge, that the “chosen” individuals should be organized into
closed castes in order to only breed individuals with the same char-
acteristics of superiority, given that the French anthropologist gives it
such importance without drawing the necessary consequences. Selec-
tion is in fact an “agent” that permits
the chosen subjects, born in the lower social spheres, to accede to the
upper echelons. The formation of castes is contrary to this selection and is
therefore a powerful agent for decadence. Some modern authors, in search
of novelty, have been taken with a great fancy for the Indian institution of
the caste. These authors never explain how it is that an institution that is
considered so excellent did not stop India from falling prey to numerous
conquerors, all lacking in castes, nor how a few thousand English are
enough to maintain British dominion over a country of around two
hundred million inhabitants. (Pareto 1896–1897, II: 416–417)
In the Paretian concept, prominence thus is given to the lower
levels of society, whose task is to nourish the process of “circulation
of the aristocracies.” It is therefore indubitably true that wealth is an
index of “superiority” and that the social hierarchy is in a large
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measure the reflection of different individual abilities.63 However,
experience shows that there are often individuals among the lower
classes who are more gifted than those in the upper ranks: “Anyone
who has ever spent some time with working men knows that one
often meets individuals among them who are far more intelligent than
this or that scientist laden with academic titles.” And as Pareto punc-
tiliously points out, this fact considerably reduces the dependability of
the research carried out by Galton and the anthroposociologists on the
biological hereditability of intellectual gifts (Pareto 1896–1897, II: 396).
This brief summary of Pareto’s distribution theory and his concep-
tion of the social hierarchy is intended to show the intellectual debt he
owed to Ammon and Lapouge. There were, naturally, notable
differences—starting with the fact that he apparently did not accept
that innate difference must be racial in origin, nor that the cephalic
index could ascertain innate differences—differences that are,
however, accompanied by a clearly declared underlying appreciation
(in the letter to Ammon quoted above, for example, Pareto concludes
with the wish that the theories of the German anthropologist might be
“taught in all the universities”). Above all, there is agreement on the
idea that individuals are heterogeneous—in contrast with the vision of
homogeneity that animated classic economic thought—and that social
and economic inequality are consequences of innate intellectual
differences.
V
The Growth of Criticisms: Social Anthropology as a “Pseudoscience”
PARETO’S CASE is perhaps emblematic of the entire parabola of social
anthropology. As we have seen, in his works published at the turn of
the century, the thinking of Ammon and Lapouge was repeatedly
debated, both in the positive and the negative sense. In his Trattato di
sociologia (1916), on the other hand, we find no further reference to
the anthroposociological literature. The heterogeneous nature of
society and the circulation of the elite remain the cardinal points of his
social theory, but they are no longer discussed in relation to Ammon
and Lapouge, while social selection disappears from the list of ques-
tions to be analyzed in the Trattato.
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It is difficult to give an explanation for this change of attitude on
Pareto’s part. It is, however, a fact that, after having enjoyed great
success in economic literature at the end of the 19th century, anthro-
posociology petered out with the coming of the new century. The
debate in the economic reviews at the turn of the century shows the
growing idea that anthroposociology was a “pseudo” science.
In a lengthy essay published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics,
John Cummings (1900) attacked the primary principle from which the
anthroposociologists started, that is, that the “ethnic factor” was deci-
sive for the understanding of social evolution. Cummings held that
terms like “race,” “ethnic factor,” or “cephalic index” were without any
scientific foundation, in that Ammon and Lapouge were never able to
give plausible definitions of the same (Cummings 1900: 201–202). He,
moreover, denied that ability and intellectual qualities solely have a
biological basis, judging the correlation with the cephalic index to be
indemonstrable: “The association of index with ethical character is a
matter of chance, and there is no correlation of cause and effect”
(1900: 197). Cummings believed instead that it was necessary to
revaluate the role of social environment, essential to the formation of
the human personality, reversing the social and political philosophy of
the anthroposociologists: “Environment is the matrix and to conceive
man apart from environmental influences is as impossible as to
conceive a cast without a mould” (1900: 199). He concluded with the
wish that this perverse deviation from Social Darwinism be swept from
the horizons of human knowledge and that the social sciences return
to their normal path:
Anthropologists do not present any data to justify the assumption that the
cephalic index carries any mental attribute or any character with it; nor can
any such contention be maintained in the face of modern psychology,
which more and more is coming to regard the head-form as irrelevant to
mental capacity or character, certainly where the size of the brain is
disregarded. Phrenology, like astrology, has had its day; and the sort of
racial phrenology with which modern anthropologists are engaged is
bound to go to the same limbo. (Cummings 1900: 211)
Closson’s reply, aimed at vindicating the empirical and statistical
foundations of anthroposociology, was to no avail.64 After Cummings’s
intervention “the school of so-called ‘anthropo-sociologists’ ” began to
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be so designated in a derogatory sense.65 The proof of this lies in the
comments made by William Z. Ripley, an economist who did not lack
in racist convictions, but who resolutely distanced himself from
Ammon, Closson, and Lapouge.66 The classification of the European
races as used by Ripley in his works is similar to that used by the
anthroposociologists. It is therefore hardly surprising that Closson at
first had included him among the potential disciples of the school of
Lapouge,67 albeit an atypical one. Ripley could therefore not have
completely supported Cummings’s sweeping criticism. This explains
his ambivalent attitude, on the one hand aimed at vindicating the
legitimacy of the model of classification of the European races that he
himself used, and, on the other, in line with the climate of scientific
discredit for the “anthropo-sociologists.” He held that the accusation
launched by Cummings against the school of Lapouge was irreproach-
able, but that it should not involve the classification of the European
races. The existence of three “physical or racial, types into which the
population of Europe may be resolved” was no invention, Ripley
wrote, “of an anthropo-sociologist.” It dated back to the research by
Broca and since then had been borne out by authoritative anthro-
pologists (1900: 428). This did not, however, justify the implications
that Lapouge, Ammon, and Closson wished to draw from the classi-
fication, which were absolutely lacking in any scientific foundation. In
substance, Ripley distanced himself from the school of Lapouge,
vindicating an approach still based on racial data but far from the
extremes desired by anthroposociology:
The “anthropo-sociologists” make the gratuitous assumption that certain
mental traits always attach themselves to the same physical ones. I have
striven manfully to disprove that any such connection exists, and that a
large part of the mental characteristics of the population of Europe are
attributable to physical and social environment, and not to race at all.
(Ripley 1900: 427)
The distance taken by Ripley from anthroposociological thought is
very important. If Closson “only dabbled briefly at the edges of
American social science,” Ripley, “on the other hand, was much closer
to the center of the stream” (Stocking 1968: 61). His disassociation,
and the criticism by Cummings, were probably decisive for the
epilogue of anthroposociology in economic literature. After 1900,
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Ammon, Closson, and Lapouge became total strangers in the eco-
nomic arena.68 But how so much of their theories found their way into
economics journals at the turn of the century and then suddenly
vanished remains puzzling (Darity 1997: 242).
A plausible explanation is that something similar to what had
happened in the sociological field occurred. In this context as well,
Ammon and Lapouge had a sudden popularity in the last few years of
the century, even leading Emile Durkheim to introduce a specific
subsection named “Anthropo-sociologie” into his journal Année
sociologique.69 After the devastating criticism of their theories by the
anthropologist Léon Manouvrier, who qualified social anthropology as
a “pseudo-science,” however, Durkheim seized the chance to sup-
press the column, judging their ideas as “too suspect.” The fortunes of
social anthropology in economic literature could therefore have had a
parabola not dissimilar to that seen in the sociological field. But it
seems unlikely that Cummings’s “intervention” was sufficient by itself
to provoke the eclipse of Ammon’s and Lapogue’s theories.
VI
From “Nature” to “Nurture”: Thorstein Veblen
ANOTHER CENTRAL QUESTION is the role of Thorstein Veblen, who was
managing editor of the Journal of Political Economics between 1896
and 1906. How is the appearance and subsequent abrupt disappear-
ance of the anthroposociological theories related to his interest in
anthropology, evolution, and biology?70 From the anthropological
point of view, the biographies regarding Veblen tend to highlight
the ascendancy exercised over him by Franz Boas, with whom
Veblen came into contact when he arrived in Chicago, where he
also had the opportunity to know Carlos Closson. Only Spindler
(2002: 23), however, mentions Closson as one of the authors who
may have influenced the anthropological thought of the American
institutionalist.
As we know, Veblen was very attracted to biological explanations of
social and economic phenomena: His famous “Why Economics Is Not
an Evolutionary Science” (1898: 373) begins with an approving quote
of Lapouge’s peremptory statement (1897: 54): “Anthropology is
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destined to revolutionize the political and the social sciences as
radically as bacteriology has revolutionised the science of medicine”
(where Lapogue is depicted as an “eminent anthropologist”). In
Veblen’s work there is also a recurring use of the concept of race and
there are several remarks about the characteristic head shapes of
European races. From this point of view, there is little doubt that
Lapouge, Ammon, and Closson (as well as other racist physical
anthropologists) were the source of Veblen’s anthropological thought.
It is, however, difficult to assess the real impact that anthroposociolo-
gists had on the founder of American institutionalism, and a full
account of Veblen’s debt to Ammon, Closson, and Lapouge has yet to
be published.
Their works are quoted in diverse circumstances (see Edgell 2001:
60), and the idea that the cephalic index was fundamental in the
identification of the racial types appears to be substantially agreed
upon. One of the most explicit citations is to be found in the Theory
of Business Enterprise, where Veblen states that races possess not only
physical differences but also specific intellectual, psychological, and
even religious characteristics. The American institutionalist writes:
If the researches of such students as Ammon, Ripley, Lapouge, Closson,
and others that might be named are taken at their face value, it appears that
the towns differ perceptibly from the open country in point of race; and
that the migration from the country into the industrial towns has a selective
effect of such a kind that a larger proportion of one racial stock than of
another resorts to the towns. The towns, in those countries where data are
available, show a larger admixture of the dolicho-blond stock than the
open country. This seems to argue that the dolicho-blond stock, or the
racial mixture of the towns in which there is a relatively large admixture of
the dolichoblond, is perceptibly more efficient in the machine industries,
more readily inclined to think in materialistic terms, more given to radical
innovation, less bound by convention and prescription. This generalization
is strengthened by the fact that the more dolicho-blond regions are also, on
the whole, more socialistic than those in which this element is less in
evidence. At the same time they are industrially in advance of the latter in
the matter of machine industry; and they are also Protestant (irreligious)
rather than Catholic. (Veblen 1904: 350, n. 24)
These sentences demonstrate the undoubtedly strong influence
exercised by the anthroposociologists, which was reinforced by the
fact that Veblen believed in the hereditary nature of cultural attitudes
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and inclinations that characterized diverse ethnic and racial groups. It
is in this sense that Tilman (1996: 57) defines Veblen as “a racialist.”
Some scholars see this cultural ascendancy as one of the major limits
of Veblen’s thought. Abram L. Harris, for instance, in his extensive
investigation of Veblen’s work, wrote that “the anthropology from
which Veblen derived his theory of three European racial types—that
differ in both physical and mental characteristics—has long been
discarded” (Harris 1951: 66).
On the other hand, it is equally certain that Veblen largely attenu-
ated the biological and racial determinism of the anthroposociologists.
He expressed notable skepticism about the possibility of identifying
pure races71 and, more generally, about the fact that a certain type of
race might be genetically superior. For Veblen, the diverse attitudes or
spiritual characteristics were to be attributed to the diverse social and
cultural contexts rather than to racial differences. In 1914, in fact, he
wrote:
It is perhaps as needless to insist on this spiritual difference between the
various racial stocks as it would be difficult to determine the specific
differences that are known to exist, or to exhibit them convincingly in
detail. To some such ground much of the distinctive character of different
peoples is no doubt to be assigned, though much also may as well be
traceable to local peculiarities of environment and of institutional circum-
stances. (Veblen [1914] 1922: 111)
A further element that differentiates him from the anthroposociolo-
gists is his insistence on the hybrid nature of the races—in particular
the European and Japanese ones—an aspect that further weakened
the theory of the preeminence of one race over another:
It should be noted in the same connection that hybrid peoples, such as
those of Europe or of Japan, where somewhat widely distinct racial stocks
are mingled, should afford a great variety and wide individual variation of
native gifts, in workmanship as in other respects. Hybrid stocks, indeed,
have a wider range of usual variability than the combined extreme limits
of the racial types that enter into the composition of the hybrid.72
It is certain, therefore, that Veblen was fascinated by the work of
Ammon, Closson, and Lapouge. But, like Ripley, he abandoned the
biological determinism typical of the anthroposociologists, shifting his
attention to institutional conditioning (i.e., nurture) and realizing the
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substantially hybrid nature of the European races, all of which makes
it difficult for us to say whether he was more or less decisive in
anthroposociology’s fate.
VII
Conclusion: The Epilogue of Social Anthropology
THE REASONS BEHIND the incredible rise of anthroposociology in eco-
nomic literature are probably to be sought in the general cultural
context of the 19th century. As Jennifer M. Hecht (2000: 304) wrote,
“we have little idea today of how utterly convinced many people were
that the European races were physiologically measurable and socially
irreconcilable.” The fact that, with the beginning of the new century,
both economics and sociology rejected the anthroposociology of
Ammon and Lapouge appears rather due to the excessive radicalism
of their theories than to their racism. It would be wrong, therefore, “to
conclude that . . . that race had ceased to be an explanatory variable”
(Llobera 2003: 118). Race-based (and eugenic) social science more
generally was pervasive outside the boundaries of anthroposociology,
and survived it. The economic arena probably ceased to be a sound-
ing board for Ammon’s and Lapouge’s theories because “they were
too extreme, and more palatable (but still racist) alternatives won
out.”73 At least until the 1920s, racist ideas continued to be promul-
gated (above all, in the debate on immigration) and some economists
maintained a “genetic racial position,” but this does not seem to
be directly linked to the anthroposociological theories we have
discussed.74
This does not mean, however, that anthroposociology failed to
reach its goal. By that point, the way had been opened. Even without
the showplace of the French- and English-speaking socioeconomic
journals, anthroposociology was able to consolidate its position due
mainly to the Politisch-Anthropologische Revue, under the editorship
of Ammon and Ludwing Woltmann. In 1909, Lapouge himself ad-
mitted that anthroposociology had become a science that was exclu-
sively “German”; the eugenic National Socialist project was beginning
to materialize, with Ammon and Lapouge as its household gods.
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1. See, for example, Social Anthropology, the journal of the European
Association of Social Anthropology, founded in 1989.
2. See Cherry (1976); Levy and Peart (2004); Peart and Levy (2003);
Colander, Prasch, and Sheth (2004); and the recent symposiums of History of
Political Economy (“Prejudice and the History of Economics: A Minisympo-
sium”) and American Journal of Economics and Sociology (“Symposium on
Eugenics During the American Progressive Era”), with essays by Weintraub
(2003), Leonard (2003), Bateman (2003), Levy and Peart (2003), Coleman
(2003), Leonard (2005c), Cot (2005), Dimand (2005), Peart and Levy (2005b),
Rutherford (2005), and Smith (2005).
3. Mucchielli (1997); Hecht (1999); Llobera (2003).
4. A brief mention of the thought of the anthroposociologists—in par-
ticular, their concept of “social selection”—can be found in the book by G.
Hodgson (2004), The Evolution of Institutional Economics.
5. “This new school, or new science . . . , has been called by its cre-
ators Anthropo-sociology, or Social Anthropology, and it is already promul-
gated by numerous champions, among whom Lapouge in France and
Ammon in Germany occupy positions of special prominence” (Loria 1899:
283).
6. For biographical detail on Lapouge, I have drawn upon Ackerknecht
(1950: 287–289); Hecht (2000: 293–294); Llobera (2003: 120–121); Quinlan
(1998: 394–395); Weiss (1987: 93–94).
7. Ammon to Lapouge, February 4, 1893, cited in Hecht (2000: 295).
8. For Ammon, as for Lapouge, “the laws of nature formulated by Darwin
are absolute in the most stringent meaning of the term” (Stark 1961: 50).
9. On the “Social Darwinism” of the two founders of anthroposociology,
see Stark (1961). On Lapouge in particular, see Hecht (1999), Bèjiin (1982),
Boissel (1982), and Clark (1981); on Ammon, see Gasman (1971) and Stein
(1988).
10. What distinguishes the authors quoted is their judgment on the
outcome of such a process, that is, whether the creation of inequality has been
a positive factor for civilization, but not the original concept of the equality of
the human being.
11. Harris (1968: 109). The question concerns all the social sciences in
general, not only anthropology. As far as political economy is concerned, in
particular, see Levy and Peart (2003, 2004, 2005a). The two scholars have
drawn attention precisely to the shift that is recorded in the economic field
from the paradigm of social homogeneity, which characterized the classical
tradition, to a concept “involving racial differences.” “In the second half of the
19th century, theories of racial heterogeneity were much discussed in British
anthropological circles, and attacks on equal competence emerged from
within economics itself” (2004: 125).
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12. Gobineau would not seem to have had a decisive influence on the
initial formation of Lapouge. According to Ammon, the Essay sur l’inegalité
des races humaines was not known to Lapouge until 1894, if not through Paul
Broca (Ammon 1898). Later, Gobineau would be regarded as a spiritual father
by anthroposociology. See Lapouge (1897: 56): “At the origin of every
discovery there is usually one man of genius. The originating genius of
anthropo-sociology was the Count de Gobineau. . . . Gobineau was no scien-
tist, but a wide traveller and a man of erudition and reflection. His funda-
mental idea was the superiority of the blond race. . . . Anthropo-sociology
dates from the Essay sur l’inegalité.”
13. “Gobineau’s Essai, which was published before Darwin’s Origin of
Species, rested primarily on second-hand historical and linguistic ‘evidence’;
the French aristocrat never attempted to incorporate biological or anthropo-
logical theories into his philosophy of history” (Weiss 1987: 93–94).
14. Calculated comparing the width and length of the head. The notion of
“cephalic index” was connected to Lavater and Gall’s “phrenology,” even if its
introduction around 1845 by the Swedish scientist André Retzius was initially
critical of phrenology (see Poliakov 1971: 299).
15. There is instead no precise psychological characterization of Homo
Mediterraneus.
16. As Closson wrote (1900a: 399), “Lapouge has measured some 12,000
subjects and Ammon 22,962, subsequently analysing from various points of
view the data thus obtained.”
17. “Measurement was essential to racial science; measurement offered a
tool for determining racial differences and a potential means for ranking the
separate races. Before the advent of intelligence testing . . . racial scientists
relied on anthropometric measurement, especially skull measurement, or
craniometry” (Leonard 2003: 689).
18. “Nature is all that a man brings with himself into the world; nurture is
every influence from without that effects him after his birth” (qtd. in Field
1911: 14). The fundamental idea of eugenics, a discipline founded by Galton,
is that the mental qualities, no less than the physical ones, are subject to the
principles of biological heredity (Field 1911: 5–6). The theory was formulated
by Galton for the first time in some writings around the mid-1860s and then
presented in systematic form in the volume Hereditary Genius (1869), in
which abundant genealogical material concerning the history of the families of
men of genius is collected (on Galton, see Cowan 1972).
19. According to Lapouge, the Enlightenment’s triad of “Liberty, Equality,
and Fraternity” should have been replaced with a motto that paid homage to
the Darwinian revolution: “Determinism, Inequality, and Selection.”
20. Lapouge (1896: 198). In 1909, Lapouge would define anthroposociol-
ogy as the science “which has as its object the study of the reciprocal action
of race and environment” (1909: vii).
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21. On this question, Stark has identified a partial difference between
Ammon and Lapouge. In the former, an optimistic vision of social selection
seems to prevail, generally holding it to be capable of generating a progres-
sive process. Lapouge, on the contrary, for motives that we will return to later,
appears much more obsessed with the idea of an involutive movement, in
which social selection operates to the detriment of the race (see Stark 1961:
49–55).
22. As, for example, racial contamination, to which we owe the reduction
in fertility in the pure dolichocephalics; or celibacy, a strategy widespread
among the members of the upper classes in order to maintain a high
socioeconomic status.
23. Battini (1995: 199). An example of a historical type was offered by
the French Revolution: “The failure of the Revolution was a clamorous
one . . . this was above all the substitution of the brachycephalic in place of
the blonde dolicho in holding power. . . . Through the Revolution the
brachycephalic conquered power, and with democratic evolution this power
tends to be concentrated in the hands of the lower classes, the most
brachycephalic. The Aryan as I have defined him is quite another thing, he is
the Homo Europaeus, a race which made France great and which is today
almost extinct here” (Lapouge 1899a: VII; 22 and 464).
24. Giove (2001: 127). Among the means for such an objective there was
also artificial insemination, to be imposed only on eugenic individuals.
25. Lapouge (1896: 471); Battini (1995: 201).
26. Lapouge (1896: 480ff); Battini (1995: 202).
27. Hecht (1999: 3). See also Stein (1988: 57–58): “Whether or not physical
anthropology is considered a true science, there is little doubt that the
anthropologists who discovered all the measurable divergent physical, psy-
chological and mental characteristics of the various races thought they were
scientific. And so did the general public.”
28. From the mid-1890s, Lapouge began to publish “in new social science
journals, such as René Worms’ Revue international de sociologie, Charles
Gide’s Revue d’economie politique and Emile Durkheim’s Année sociologique”
(Schneider 1990: 62).
29. “During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the pages of
the Journal of Political Economy and the Quarterly Journal of Economics were
filled with studies by anthropometrics ranking the relative qualities of racial
groups on both physical and mental dimensions. The distinctive nineteenth-
century concept of race blended nationality, culture and genetics to distin-
guish human groups. Craniometry was a popular subject matter in economics
journal of the day” (Darity 1997: 242).
30. A brief reference to Closson’s university years may be found in the
autobiography by Robert Morss Lovett, who attended Harvard at the same
time and himself taught English literature at Chicago. See Lovett (1948: 39–42).
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31. In the Annual Register of University of Chicago, Closson is listed as
faculty for the school years 1894–1895 and 1895–1896 only (p. 19). At this
time, Thorstein Veblen is listed as “Tutor in Political Economy.” I would like
to thank David Pavelich, Reference and Instruction Librarian of the University
of Chicago, for this information.
32. See Stocking (1968: 60): “From 1895 to 1900 anthroposociological
doctrines were summarized and explicated for American social scientists by
Closson, who in the interval between his undergraduate years at Harvard and
his later life as a real estate broker on the West Coast was an instructor of
economics at the University of Chicago.”
33. Closson also speaks at times of “statistical anthropology” to underline
the quantitative approach that marks the new discipline. The essential
aspect remains, however, the overcoming of the traditional boundaries
between disciplines produced in the field of social sciences by the advent
of the new “school”: “The work of Ammon himself, together with that of De
Lapouge, has not only brought statistical anthropology into close relation
with politics, economics, ethics, psychology, the interpretation of history
and especially sociology; but conversely it has also transformed the
methods of anthropological investigation itself, enriching that science with
new categories and distinctions, and with a multitude of new problems”
(Closson 1896c: 411–412).
34. Closson (1896b: 93–94). This is the so-called Law of Social Stratifica-
tion, to which we will return.
35. “Law of Displacement. The dolichocephalic type, being more
enterprising and restless, is more largely represented among the migrants
to the cities and the foreign countries. The law affirms the greater mobility
of Homo Europaeus” (Closson 1896b: 94). In Lapouge (1897: 416–418),
the “Law of Displacement” is articulated into diverse subspecies: (a)
Law of Altitudes: The European man settles chiefly in the plains; (b)
Law of Distribution of the cities: The most important cities are all located
where there is a prevalence of dolichocephalics; (c) Law of urban Indexes:
The cephalic index of the urban populations is lower than that of the
rural populations; (d) Law of Mobility (or Ammon’s Law, to whom
the discovery that the urban populations are largely dolichocephalic is
attributed): The dolichocephalic populations are characterized by greater
mobility.
36. The spread of the theories of anthroposociology in the English-
speaking press, as ever through the work of Closson, extended to the
American Journal of Sociology. Besides publishing his own writings on the
hierarchy of the European races (Closson 1897), the economist translated
the introduction to one of Lapouge’s main books, L’aryen, in which the
French anthropologist gives his reasons for the choice of the term to define
the “elect” dolichocephalic race (see Lapouge 1899a, 1899b).
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37. Closson discloses in the initial notes that he has the translation of the
entire book underway, but we have no news that this translation was ever
published.
38. “Known at the time as the ‘law of error,’ the formulation derived from
the analysis by the German mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss of errors made
in the measurement of ‘true’ physical quantities—for example, planetary
position in astronomy. Portrayed graphically, the Gaussian distribution formed
the now familiar bell curve” (Kevles 1995: 13).
39. The formula concerned is y Ye h x= −
2 2
. “In the formula x signifies the
degree of variation from the mean, y the relative frequency of the appearance
of this variation (that is its ‘probability’), Y the frequency of the mean, e the
basis of the hyperbolic logarithms, h the so-called coefficient of precision
which determines whether the frequency of occurrence shall diminish more
or less rapidly with the increasing degree of variation from the mean. The
quantity e is a constant, fixed once and for all; Y and h are constants which
may be altered according as the formula is differently utilized” (Ammon 1896:
214).
40. The English scientist, in his studies on genius, had tried to demonstrate
the convergence between the distribution of aptitude and social status. His
reasoning, however, stopped at the idea of a correspondence between what
he called “reputation” and “ability”: High reputation, Galton wrote, “is a pretty
accurate test of high ability” (Galton 1869: 2).
41. “The highest possible throw is that in which the sum of the spot is
equal to 24, and this can occur only in a single way, namely, that every die
shows six spots. In our parable this suggests that among 1296 individuals will
be found only a single one in whom the mental, moral economic, and bodily
traits all attain the highest grade” (Ammon 1896: 207).
42. The “throw showing 1 spot on each of the four dice, signifies in our
comparison a man exceptionally poor in all four groups of traits, weak-
winded and sickly” (1896: 208–209).
43. The imperfect correspondence between the two curves is due to
the fact that Ammon’s experiment is conducted imagining “the combination
of only a few elements or traits; the more elements co-operate the
more traits must meet in a genius, the broader is the curve in the
centre, and the more tapering is its attenuation both above and below”
(1896: 218).
44. These individuals “are so poorly endowed that they can only with
difficulty and in an incomplete way take part in the life of society. In this
category belong not only those who are not able to accomplish work which
requires intelligence and skill, but also those of insufficient moral character”
(Ammon 1896: 218).
45. Ammon took “the distribution of incomes from the income-tax statistics
of Saxony for the year 1890” (Staehle 1943: 77).
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46. “Laws of the distribution of wealth: In a country jointly inhabited by
Homo Europeaus, the former element possesses more than its proportionate
share of wealth” (Lapouge 1897: 61).
47. “The cephalic index is lower and the proportion of dolichocephalic
greater among the higher classes than among the lower classes in each
community “(Lapouge 1897: 87). See also Closson’s formulation: “Law of
Social Stratification. The dolichocephalic type, being psychologically more
domineering and ambitious, is more generally represented among the higher
and ruling classes; the brachycephalic type is found generally in a subordinate
social position. The law, then, affirms the social superiority of Homo
Europaeus” (Closson 1896b: 93–94).
48. For Lapouge, “the ‘Aryan race’ is the only race capable of high social,
intellectual, and cultural achievements, and is in fact the true biological
underpinning of Western civilization” (Weiss 1987: 93–94).
49. “Among intellectual workers the absolute dimension of the head and
particularly the breadth, are greater than the average” (Lapouge 1897: 90,
original emphasis; in the following, the emphasis, if not otherwise stated, is in
the original text). The French anthropologist clarifies that the law of the
intellectual classes is different from the law of distribution and stratification,
and can at times be in conflict with them: “The intellectual worker tends to
possess an exceptional breadth of head more marked than the exceptional
length. He is likely then to be less dolichocephalic than the average of his
social compeers; he is likely to possess a degree of eurycephaly which may
be easily confused with brachycephaly” (1897: 91).
50. “What is lacking here is . . . insufficient strength in the intellectual,
moral, and economic traits to advance the individual to a higher position”
(Ammon 1896: 230).
51. The democratic and egalitarian aspiration is in Lapouge’s opinion an
intellectual perversion inspired “by the dreams of that most visionary of all
centuries, the eighteenth” (Lapouge 1896: 259).
52. In fact, Pareto observes that for some “authors, like Lapouge, the
zoological race of men explains everything. This is one of the reasons why he
was overlooked. It is his merit to have placed it well in evidence, even if he
exaggerated its action, but considering it as unique it is nothing less than pure
fiction” (Pareto 1898: 158).
53. “To say that there are in society men who have certain qualities in a
more eminent measure than others and to say that there exists a class of men
who are in the absolute sense better is already not the same thing” (Pareto
1896–1897, II: 392).
54. Pareto (1901–1902: 554). See also Pareto (1906: 312–313): “The
humanitarians can close their eyes and deliberately ignore this truth, but that
in no way changes the fact. Some degenerate elements which have to be
eliminated by selection are born in every species. The unhappiness caused by
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this destruction is the price paid for perfecting the race, it is one of those many
cases where the good of the individual is at variance with the good of the
species.”
55. At the beginning, Pareto had criticized the representation proposed by
Ammon, which is, however, revaluated in the work following the Cours.
Pareto wrote “that which is called social pyramid is in reality a kind of
spinning top,” that “which is indicated by Otto Ammon, which seems quite
plausible” (Pareto 1901–1902: 19).
56. Vilfredo Pareto to Otto Ammon, November 30, 1900, Banca Popolare
di Sondrio, Fondo Vilfredo Pareto (IT PopSo FP R11C023). I am grateful to Pier
Carlo Della Ferrera and the Banca Popolare di Sondrio for permission to cite
this unpublished letter of Pareto.
57. Pareto and Ammon are frequently associated for having first high-
lighted “that the distribution of incomes is strongly skewed” (Staehle 1943: 77;
Lebergott 1959: 328).
58. “When Pareto said that his results did not depend on mere chance, he
really meant that the distribution of incomes had nothing whatsoever to do
with either the normal curve or any of its skewed variants” (Staehle 1943: 78).
59. Pareto (1906: 304). Despite the several implications that Pareto draws
from these principles, he underlines how Closson (1896d), in the article in
which he discusses the concepts of selection and stability, “has made an
important contribution to this line of study” (Pareto 1897: 502).
60. V. Pareto to G. Prezzolini, December 17, 1903, in Pareto (1973, I: 507)
see also Pareto (1906: 312, 1901–1902: 131) where the research of Ammon and
Lapouge is mentioned as “scientific confirmation” of the fact that “the history
of human society is, in the greater part, the history of the alternation of
aristocracies.”
61. This suspension of judgment on the theories of social anthropology, to
be left until the facts are verified, recurs in diverse instances in the works of
Pareto. A propos of the thesis sustained by Lapouge, for example, that in
ancient Rome, the elite had declined because of “the exhaustion of eugenics,
of men of the superior race,” Pareto comments that “we lack facts to allow for
the absolute acceptance or rejection of this opinion” (Pareto 1901–1902: 157).
62. “If, in fact, from some exterior signs, such as the shape of the skull, the
colour of the hair, of the eyes etc, it were possible to recognise the character and
habits of men, the problem of the best social organisation would be easily
resolved. Unfortunately, these theories have still an uncertain link with reality,
and for the moment we know of no other means of choosing men except that
of finding out what they know how to do, placing them in competition one with
the other. This takes place, even if in a most imperfect mode, in our societies,
and history demonstrates that their progress has been intimately linked to the
extension of this custom” (Pareto 1901–1902: 342). Pareto proposes an
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interesting parallel between Lapouge’s theory and that of Plato, whose “golden
race” in a version by the French anthropologist “would be that of the blonde
dolichocephalics.”
63. “The so-called superior classes are also generally also the richest.
These classes constitute an elite, an aristocracy (in the etymological sense:
aristoς = the best)” (Pareto 1901–1902: 131).
64. “While the economist and the worker in many branches of social science
can draw without labour and without price upon a vast mass of official statistics,
the anthropo-sociologists have had to collect their own data by the slow process
of measuring individuals and by the vastly slower process of persuading them
one by one to allow themselves to be measured” (Closson 1900a: 398).
65. Although it appeared in an anthropological journal, the position
taken by the Italian economist Achille Loria is also significant. Loria’s inter-
est is in Ammon’s theory of the social hierarchy, and in particular in his
attempt to prove the coincidence between the ability curve and the income
curve. The Italian economist holds that Ammon does not prove anything
from this point of view, and that no coincidence is possible “in regard to
the question under discussion” (1899: 293). Loria concludes with a com-
prehensive negative judgment of the scientific project of the anthroposoci-
ologists, held to be deleterious to the development of the social sciences.
The theory of Ammon, “with its errors, its paradoxes, and the absurdity of
the practical conclusions to which it leads, constitutes a direct proof, drawn
from anthropologic and biologic studies themselves, of the fallacy of a
scientific tendency which pretends to turn social science into an appendage
of anthropology” (Loria 1899: 296).
66. “Although Ripley made a special point of dissociating himself from the
anthroposociologists,” both Closson and Cummings “insisted on the linkage”
(Stocking 1968: 323, n. 42).
67. “The anthropo-sociological school may well be content to welcome
Professor Ripley . . . as on the whole an adherent, if indeed a somewhat
eclectic one” (Closson 1899: 241).
68. To our knowledge, echoes of the anthroposociological theories are to
be found only in the works of Veblen, which we will discuss later, in Sorokin
(1927) and in von Mises (see his Socialism [1922] 1951: 314–327).
69. The French sociologist did not like anthroposociology, “but as long as
Lapouge appeared to be a good scientist, Durkheim felt obliged to permit
extremely positive reviews of his work to be printed in the journal” (Hecht
1999: 8). On the relations between the Durkheimiens and the anthroposoci-
ologists, see also Mucchielli (1997) and Llobera (2003: 110–115).
70. This is underlined by Darity (1997: 242), according to whom a partial
explanation, with respect to the Journal of Political Economics, of the spread of
anthroposociological theory may be the interest of Thorstein Veblen in such
theories.
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71. “There neither is nor ever has been a pure-bred dolicho-blond indi-
vidual” (Veblen 1913b: 469; Edgell 2001: 60; see also Veblen 1913a).
72. Veblen ([1914] 1922: 111–112). According to Edell, Veblen showed
himself to be quite cautious in the use of the actual term “race,” preferring
expressions like “social groups” or “ethnic types.” “Veblen’s choice of
terminology reflects his view that culture rather than nature was more
important in the social scientific analysis of change” (Edgell 2001: 60).
73. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for underscoring this point.
74. On the persistence of race-thinking in economics at the beginning of
the 20th century, see, among others, Cherry (1976), Leonard (2003, 2005a,
2005b, 2005c), Cot (2005), and Dimand (2005).
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